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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               
No. 04-2786
                               
FELIX ORIAKHI,
                                                             Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-00850)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 14, 2005
Before: ROTH, RENDELL AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: February 10, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Felix Oriakhi, a federal prisoner, filed an action pursuant to the Federal Torts
Claims Act (“FTCA”) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
2alleging that Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) staff “stole [his] collection of female
pornographic magazines” and two microwave bowls, and improperly returned to the
publisher a book containing nudity that Oriakhi had ordered.  The District Court
dismissed Oriakhi’s Bivens claim concerning the book for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and, following a bench trial, entered judgment in favor of the
appellee on Oriakhi’s FTCA claim regarding the allegedly stolen property.  This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Oriakhi alleges that his Bivens claim should not have been dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because he completed the exhaustion
process “before the defendant filed it[s] answer[] to appellant[’s] complaint.”  
Appellant’s Brief, 7.  Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of the Bivens claim for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is plenary.  See Jenkins v. Morton, 148 F.3d
257, 259 (3d Cir. 1998).  The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) prohibits an inmate
from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by
prison officials “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”  42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added).  To satisfy this requirement, a prisoner must exhaust
all available administrative remedies prior to filing suit, including a Bivens action.  See
Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2002); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d
65, 68 (3d Cir. 2000).  Oriakhi’s complaint was filed in April 2001; he concedes that he
did not begin the BOP administrative review process until May 2001.  Clearly, then,
Oriakhi’s administrative remedies were not exhausted prior to the initiation of suit.  The
     1 We note that Oriakhi filed a separate complaint on October 18, 2002, alleging that he
had exhausted his administrative remedies.  See Oriakhi v. Yates, et al., M.D. Pa. Civ.
No. 02-cv-1869.  The District Court dismissed that action because Oriakhi did not timely
comply with its order to pay the filing fee or seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 
Oriakhi did not appeal.  Contrary to Oriakhi’s contention, see Appellant’s Brief, 13, the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request to consolidate the
underlying case with the action at M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 02-cv-1869.  See In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that management of its docket
is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court).  Not only had the other action
been dismissed, but the divergent issues presented in the two suits counseled against
consolidation.
3
fact that he completed the administrative review process before the District Court reached
the exhaustion question is of no consequence.  Indeed, there appears to be unanimous
circuit court consensus that a prisoner may not fulfill the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
by exhausting administrative remedies after the filing of the complaint in federal court. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases and
holding that “the district court must look to the time of filing, not the time the district
court is rendering its decision, to determine if exhaustion has occurred”).  Accordingly,
the District Court properly dismissed Oriakhi’s Bivens claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.1   
With respect to his FTCA claim, Oriakhi challenges the District Court’s findings
of fact, its denial of his motion to compel discovery, and its refusal to permit him to
communicate by telephone with potential witnesses confined at other prisons.  We review
the District Court's findings of fact for clear error.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Icicle
Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986).  Under this standard, we may
4reverse a finding of fact only if it is “devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no
rational relationship to the supporting data.”  Shire US Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 329
F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2003).  The issue at trial was whether Oriakhi in fact possessed the
magazines and microwave bowls that he alleged were stolen by BOP staff during a search
of his cell.  The District Court found that Oriakhi and his witnesses were not credible and
that circumstantial evidence undermined his claim.  In particular, the District Court noted
that the magazines were not listed either in Oriakhi’s personal property records or in a log
of items confiscated during the cell search.  Furthermore, Oriakhi and his witnesses
provided conflicting testimony concerning the time of the cell search and whether,
following such a search, BOP staff routinely provide inmates with confiscation slips
documenting any seized property.  The witnesses also were unable to identify the titles of
the magazines Oriakhi allegedly possessed.  Oriakhi presented no evidence concerning
the alleged theft of the bowls or their value.  Consequently, after a thorough review of the
record, we find no clear error in the District Court’s factual findings. 
In addition, we discern no abuse of discretion with respect to Oriakhi’s discovery
and trial preparation issues.  See Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298,
1310 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying “abuse of discretion standard when reviewing orders
regarding the scope and conduct of discovery”).  Oriakhi filed a motion to compel
discovery after the appellee informed him that it would not respond to his second set of
interrogatories, which were served approximately one year after the expiration of the
court-ordered discovery period.  The record confirms the District Court’s conclusion that
5Oriakhi failed to seek leave of court to extend the discovery period, and that the
interrogatories bore “no relationship to the responses provided to the first set of
interrogatories” or to the information required to be produced by a prior discovery order. 
The District Court also properly denied Oriakhi’s motion for telephone access to potential
inmate witnesses.  Recognizing “valid institutional security concerns” associated with
permitting such access, the District Court emphasized that Oriakhi would be permitted to
engage in expedited written communications with his witnesses via facsimile.  Oriakhi
has not specifically identified how his ability to prepare for trial was prejudiced by this
limitation, or by his transfer to another prison prior to trial.  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
